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Abstract
Bayesian inference has great promise for the
privacy-preserving analysis of sensitive data, as
posterior sampling automatically preserves dif-
ferential privacy, an algorithmic notion of data
privacy, under certain conditions (Dimitrakakis
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015b). While this
one posterior sample (OPS) approach elegantly
provides privacy “for free,” it is data inefficient
in the sense of asymptotic relative efficiency
(ARE). We show that a simple alternative based
on the Laplace mechanism, the workhorse of dif-
ferential privacy, is as asymptotically efficient as
non-private posterior inference, under general as-
sumptions. This technique also has practical ad-
vantages including efficient use of the privacy
budget for MCMC. We demonstrate the practi-
cality of our approach on a time-series analysis of
sensitive military records from the Afghanistan
and Iraq wars disclosed by the Wikileaks organi-
zation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic models trained via Bayesian inference are
widely and successfully used in application domains where
privacy is invaluable, from text analysis (Blei et al.,
2003; Goldwater and Griffiths, 2007), to personalization
(Salakhutdinov and Mnih, 2008), to medical informatics
(Husmeier et al., 2006), to MOOCs (Piech et al., 2013).
In these applications, data scientists must carefully bal-
ance the benefits and potential insights from data analysis
against the privacy concerns of the individuals whose data
are being studied (Daries et al., 2014).
Dwork et al. (2006) placed the notion of privacy-preserving
data analysis on a solid foundation by introducing differen-
tial privacy (Dwork and Roth, 2013), an algorithmic for-
mulation of privacy which is a gold standard for privacy-
preserving data-driven algorithms. Differential privacy
measures the privacy “cost” of an algorithm. When de-
signing privacy-preserving methods, the goal is to achieve
a good trade-off between privacy and utility, which ideally
improves with the amount of available data.
As observed by Dimitrakakis et al. (2014) and Wang et al.
(2015b), Bayesian posterior sampling behaves synergisti-
cally with differential privacy because it automatically pro-
vides a degree of differential privacy under certain condi-
tions. However, there are substantial gaps between this ele-
gant theory and the practical reality of Bayesian data analy-
sis. Privacy-preserving posterior sampling is hampered by
data inefficiency, as measured by asymptotic relative effi-
ciency (ARE). In practice, it generally requires artificially
selected constraints on the spaces of parameters as well as
data points. Its privacy properties are also not typically
guaranteed for approximate inference.
This paper identifies these gaps between theory and prac-
tice, and begins to mend them via an extremely simple
alternative technique based on the workhorse of differen-
tial privacy, the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006).
Our approach is equivalent to a generalization of Zhang
et al. (2016)’s recently and independently proposed algo-
rithm for beta-Bernoulli systems. We provide a theoretical
analysis and empirical validation of the advantages of the
proposed method. We extend both our method and Dimi-
trakakis et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2015b)’s one posterior
sample (OPS) method to the case of approximate inference
with privacy-preserving MCMC. Finally, we demonstrate
the practical applicability of this technique by showing how
to use a privacy-preserving HMM model to analyze sensi-
tive military records from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
leaked by the Wikileaks organization. Our primary contri-
butions are as follows:
• We analyze the privacy cost of posterior sampling for
exponential family posteriors via OPS.
• We explore a simple Laplace mechanism alternative
to OPS for exponential families.
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• Under weak conditions we establish the consistency
of the Laplace mechanism approach and its data effi-
ciency advantages over OPS.
• We extend the OPS and Laplace mechanism methods
to approximate inference via MCMC.
• We demonstrate the practical implications with a case
study on sensitive military records.
2 BACKGROUND
We begin by discussing preliminaries on differential pri-
vacy and its application to Bayesian inference. Our novel
contributions will begin in Section 3.1.
2.1 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy is a formal notion of the privacy of
data-driven algorithms. For an algorithm to be differen-
tially private the probabilities of the outputs of the algo-
rithms may not change much when one individual’s data
point is modified, thereby revealing little information about
any one individual’s data. More precisely, a randomized al-
gorithmM(X) is said to be (, δ)-differentially private if
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp()Pr(M(X′) ∈ S) + δ (1)
for all measurable subsets S of the range ofM and for all
datasetsX,X′ differing by a single entry (Dwork and Roth,
2013). If δ = 0, the algorithm is said to be -differentially
private.
2.1.1 The Laplace Mechanism
One straightforward method for obtaining -differential
privacy, known as the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al.,
2006), adds Laplace noise to the revealed information,
where the amount of noise depends on , and a quantifiable
notion of the sensitivity to changes in the database. Specif-
ically, the L1 sensitivity4h for function h is defined as
4h = max
X,X′
‖h(X)− h(X′)‖1 (2)
for all datasetsX, X′ differing in at most one element. The
Laplace mechanism adds noise via
ML(X, h, ) = h(X) + (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yd) , (3)
Yj ∼ Laplace(4h/),∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} ,
where d is the dimensionality of the range of h. The
ML(X, h, ) mechanism is -differentially private.
2.1.2 The Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007)
aims to output responses of high utility while maintain-
ing privacy. Given a utility function u(X, r) that maps
database X/output r pairs to a real-valued score, the expo-
nential mechanismME(X, u, ) produces random outputs
via
Pr(ME(X, u, ) = r) ∝ exp
(u(X, r)
24u
)
, (4)
where the sensitivity of the utility function is
4u , max
r,(X(1),X(2))
‖u(X(1), r)− u(X(2), r)‖1 , (5)
in which (X(1),X(2)) are pairs of databases that differ in
only one element.
2.1.3 Composition Theorems
A key property of differential privacy is that it holds under
composition, via an additive accumulation.
Theorem 1. If M1 is (1, δ1)-differentially private, and
M2 is (2, δ2)-differentially private, then M1,2(X) =
(M1(X),M2(X)) is (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially pri-
vate.
This allows us to view the total  and δ of our procedure as
a privacy “budget” that we spend across the operations of
our analysis. There also exists an “advanced composition”
theorem which provides privacy guarantees in an adversar-
ial adaptive scenario called k-fold composition, and also
allows an analyst to trade an increased δ for a smaller  in
this scenario (Dwork et al., 2010). Differential privacy is
also immune to data-independent post-processing.
2.2 PRIVACY AND BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Suppose we would like a differentially private draw of pa-
rameters and latent variables of interest θ from the posterior
Pr(θ|X), where X = {x1, . . . ,xN} is the private dataset.
We can accomplish this by interpreting posterior sampling
as an instance of the exponential mechanism with utility
function u(X, θ) = logPr(θ,X), i.e. the log joint proba-
bility of the chosen θ assignment and the dataset X (Wang
et al., 2015b). We then draw θ via
f(θ;X, ) ∝ exp
(  logPr(θ,X)
24 logPr(θ,X)
)
= Pr(θ,X)

24 logPr(θ,X)
(6)
where the sensitivity is4 logPr(θ,X) ,
max
θ,(X(1),X(2))
‖ logPr(θ,X(1))− logPr(θ,X(2))‖1 (7)
in which X(1) and X(2) differ in one element. If the data
points are conditionally independent given θ,
logPr(θ,X) = logPr(θ) +
N∑
i=1
logPr(xi|θ) , (8)
where Pr(θ) is the prior and Pr(xi|θ) is the likelihood
term for data point xi. Since the prior does not depend
on the data, and each data point is associated with a single
log-likelihood term logPr(xi|θ) in logPr(θ,X), from the
above two equations we have
4 logPr(θ,X) = max
x,x′,θ
| logPr(x′|θ)− logPr(x|θ)| .
(9)
This gives us the privacy cost of posterior sampling:
Theorem 2. If maxx,x′∈χ,θ∈Θ | logPr(x′|θ) −
logPr(x|θ)| ≤ C, releasing one sample from the posterior
distribution Pr(θ|X) with any prior is 2C-differentially
private.
Wang et al. (2015b) derived this form of the result from
first principles, while noting that the exponential mecha-
nism can be used, as we do here. Although they do not
explicitly state the theorem, they implicitly use it to show
two noteworthy special cases, referred to as the One Pos-
terior Sample (OPS) procedure. We state the first of these
cases:
Theorem 3. If maxx∈χ,θ∈Θ | logPr(x|θ)| ≤ B, releasing
one sample from the posterior distribution Pr(θ|X) with
any prior is 4B-differentially private.
This follows directly from Theorem 2, since if
| logPr(x|θ)| ≤ B, C = 4 logPr(θ,X) = 2B.
Under the exponential mechanism,  provides an ad-
justable knob trading between privacy and fidelity. When
 = 0, the procedure samples from a uniform distribu-
tion, giving away no information about X. When  =
24 logPr(θ,X), the procedure reduces to sampling θ
from the posterior Pr(θ|X) ∝ Pr(θ,X). As  approaches
infinity the procedure becomes increasingly likely to sam-
ple the θ assignment with the highest posterior probabil-
ity. Assuming that our goal is to sample rather than to
find a mode, we would cap  at 24 logPr(θ,X) in the
above procedure in order to correctly sample from the true
posterior. More generally, if our privacy budget is ′, and
′ ≥ 2q4 logPr(θ,X), for integer q, we can draw q pos-
terior samples within our budget.
As observed by Huang and Kannan (2012), the exponen-
tial mechanism can be understood via statistical mechanics.
We can write it as a Boltzmann distribution (a.k.a. a Gibbs
measure)
f(θ;x, ) ∝ exp
(−E(θ)
T
)
, T =
24u(X, θ)

, (10)
where E(θ) = −u(X, θ) = − logPr(θ,X) is the energy
of state θ in a physical system, and T is the temperature
of the system (in units such that Boltzmann’s constant is
one). Reducing  corresponds to increasing the tempera-
ture, which can be understood as altering the distribution
such that a Markov chain moves through the state space
more rapidly.
3 PRIVACY FOR EXPONENTIAL
FAMILIES: EXPONENTIAL VS
LAPLACE
By analyzing the privacy cost of sampling from exponential
family posteriors in the general case we can recover the pri-
vacy properties of many standard distributions. These re-
sults can be applied to full posterior sampling, when feasi-
ble, or to Gibbs sampling updates, as we discuss in Section
4. In this section we analyze the privacy cost of sampling
from exponential family posterior distributions exactly (or
at an appropriate temperature) via the exponential mecha-
nism, following Dimitrakakis et al. (2014) and Wang et al.
(2015b), and via a method based on the Laplace mecha-
nism, which is a generalization of Zhang et al. (2016). The
properties of the two methods are compared in Table 1.
3.1 THE EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM
Consider exponential family models with likelihood
Pr(x|θ) = h(x)g(θ) exp
(
θᵀS(x)
)
,
where S(x) is a vector of sufficient statistics for data point
x, and θ is a vector of natural parameters. For N i.i.d. data
points, we have
Pr(X|θ) =
( N∏
i=1
h(x(i))
)
g(θ)N exp
(
θᵀ
N∑
i=1
S(x(i))
)
.
Further suppose that we have a conjugate prior which is
also an exponential family distribution,
Pr(θ|χ, α) = f(χ, α)g(θ)α exp
(
αθᵀχ
)
,
where α is a scalar, the number of prior “pseudo-counts,”
and χ is a parameter vector. The posterior is proportional
to the prior times the likelihood,
Pr(θ|X, χ, α) ∝ g(θ)N+α exp
(
θᵀ
( N∑
i=1
S(x(i)) + αχ
))
.
(11)
To compute the sensitivity of the posterior, we have
| logPr(x′|θ)− logPr(x|θ)| (12)
= |θᵀ
(
S(x′)− S(x)
)
+ log h(x′)− log h(x)| .
From Equation 9, we obtain4 logPr(θ,X) =
sup
x,x′∈χ,θ∈Θ
|θᵀ
(
S(x′)− S(x)
)
+ log h(x′)− log h(x)| .
(13)
A posterior sample at temperature T ,
PrT (θ|X, χ, α) ∝ g(θ)
N+α
T exp
(
θᵀ
∑N
i=1 S(x
(i)) + αχ
T
)
,
T =
24 log p(θ,X)

, (14)
Mechanism Sensitivity S(X) is Release ARE Pay Gibbs cost
Laplace supX,X′ ‖
∑N
i=1 S(x
′(i))−∑Ni=1 S(x(i))‖1 Noised Statistics 1 Once
Exponential supx,x′∈χ,θ∈Θ |θᵀ
(
S(x′)− S(x)
)
Rescaled One 1 + T Per update
(OPS) + log h(x′)− log h(x)| Sample (unless converged)
Table 1: Comparison of the properties of the two methods for private Bayesian inference.
has privacy cost , by the exponential mechanism. As an
example, consider a beta-Bernoulli model,
Pr(p|α, β) = 1
B(α, β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1
=
1
B(α, β)
exp((α− 1) log p+ (β − 1) log(1− p))
Pr(x|p) = px(1− p)1−x = exp(x log p+ (1− x) log(1− p))
whereB(α, β) is the beta function. GivenN binary-valued
data points X = x(1), . . . , x(N) from the Bernoulli distri-
bution, the posterior is
Pr(p|X, α, β) ∝
exp
((
n+ + α− 1
)
log p+
(
n− + β − 1
)
log(1− p)
)
n+ =
N∑
i=1
x(i), n− =
N∑
i=1
(1− x(i)) .
The sufficient statistics for each data point are S(x) =
[x, 1 − x]ᵀ. The natural parameters for the likelihood are
θ = [log p, log(1 − p)]ᵀ, and h(x) = 0. The exponen-
tial mechanism sensitivity for a truncated version of this
model, where a0 ≤ p ≤ 1 − a0, can be computed from
Equation 13,4 logPr(θ,X) =
sup
x,x′∈{0,1},p∈[a0,1−a0]
|x log p+ (1− x) log(1− p)
− (x′ log p+ (1− x′) log(1− p))|
= − log a0 + log(1− a0) . (15)
Note that if a0 = 0, corresponding to a standard untrun-
cated beta distribution, the sensitivity is unbounded. This
makes intuitive sense because some datasets are impossible
if p = 0 or p = 1, which violates differential privacy.
3.2 THE LAPLACE MECHANISM
One limitation of the exponential mechanism / OPS ap-
proach to private Bayesian inference is that the temperature
T of the approximate posterior is fixed for any  that we are
willing to pay, regardless of the number of data points N
(Equation 10). While the posterior becomes more accurate
as N increases, and the OPS approximation becomes more
accurate by proxy, the OPS approximation remains a fac-
tor of T flatter than the posterior at N data points. This
is not simply a limitation of the analysis. An adversary
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Figure 1: Privacy-preserving approximate posteriors for a
beta-Bernoulli model ( = 1, the true parameter p = 0.3,
OPS truncation point a0 = 0.2, and number of observa-
tions N = 20). For the Laplace mechanism, 30 privatizing
draws are rendered.
can choose data such that the dataset-specific privacy cost
of posterior sampling approaches the worst case given by
the exponential mechanism as N increases, by causing the
posterior to concentrate on the worst-case θ (see the sup-
plement for an example).
Here, we provide a simple Laplace mechanism alternative
for exponential family posteriors, which becomes increas-
ingly faithful to the true posterior with N data points, as
N increases, for any fixed privacy cost , under general as-
sumptions. The approach is based on the observation that
for exponential family posteriors, as in Equation 11, the
data interacts with the distribution only through the aggre-
gate sufficient statistics, S(X) =
∑N
i=1 S(x
(i)). If we re-
lease privatized versions of these statistics we can use them
to perform any further operations that we’d like, including
drawing samples, computing moments and quantiles, and
so on. This can straightforwardly be accomplished via the
Laplace mechanism:
Sˆ(X) = proj(S(X) + (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yd)) , (16)
Yj ∼ Laplace(4S(X)/),∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} ,
where proj(·) is a projection onto the space of sufficient
statistics, if the Laplace noise takes it out of this region.
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Figure 2: L1 error for private approximate samples from
a beta posterior over a Bernoulli success parameter p, as a
function of the number of Bernoulli(p) observations, aver-
aged over 1000 repeats. The true parameter was p = 0.1,
the exponential mechanism posterior was truncated at a0 =
0.05, and  = 0.1.
For example, if the statistics are counts, the projection en-
sures that they are non-negative. The L1 sensitivity of the
aggregate statistics is
4S(X) = sup
X,X′
‖
N∑
i=1
S(x′(i))−
N∑
i=1
S(x(i))‖1 (17)
= sup
x,x′
‖S(x′)− S(x)‖1 ,
where X, X′ differ in at most one element. Note that per-
turbing the sufficient statistics is equivalent to perturbing
the parameters, which was recently and independently pro-
posed by Zhang et al. (2016) for beta-Bernoulli models
such as Bernoulli naive Bayes.
A comparison of Equations 17 and 13 reveals that the
L1 sensitivity and exponential mechanism sensitivities are
closely related. The L1 sensitivity is generally easier to
control as it does not involve θ or h(x) but otherwise in-
volves similar terms to the exponential mechanism sen-
sitivity. For example, in the beta posterior case, where
S(x) = [x, 1 − x] is a binary indicator vector, the L1
sensitivity is 2. This should be contrasted to the expo-
nential mechanism sensitivity of Equation 15, which de-
pends heavily on the truncation point, and is unbounded
for a standard untruncated beta distribution. The L1 sen-
sitivity is fixed regardless of the number of data points N ,
and so the amount of Laplace noise to add becomes smaller
relative to the total S(X) as N increases.
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in behavior between the
two privacy-preserving Bayesian inference algorithms for a
beta distribution posterior with Bernoulli observations. The
OPS estimator requires the distribution be truncated, here
at a0 = 0.2. This controls the exponential mechanism sen-
sitivity, which determines the temperature T of the distri-
bution, i.e. the extent to which the distribution is flattened,
for a given . Here, T = 2.7. In contrast, the Laplace
mechanism achieves privacy by adding noise to the suffi-
cient statistics, which in this case are the pseudo-counts of
successes and failures for the posterior distribution. In Fig-
ure 2 we illustrate the fidelity benefits of posterior sampling
based on the Laplace mechanism instead of the exponential
mechanism as the amount of data increases. In this case the
exponential mechanism performs better than the Laplace
mechanism only when the number of data points is very
small (approximately N = 10), and is quickly overtaken
by the Laplace mechanism sampling procedure. As N in-
creases the accuracy of sampling from the Laplace mecha-
nism’s approximate posterior converges to the performance
of samples from the true posterior at the current number of
observations N , while the exponential mechanism behaves
similarly to the posterior with fewer than N observations.
We show this formally in the next subsection.
3.3 THEORETICAL RESULTS
First, we show that the Laplace mechanism approximation
of exponential family posteriors approaches the true pos-
terior distribution evaluated at N data points. Proofs are
given in the supplementary.
Lemma 1. For a minimal exponential family given a
conjugate prior, where the posterior takes the form
Pr(θ|X, χ, α) ∝ g(θ)n+α exp
(
θᵀ
(∑n
i=1 S(x
(i)) +
αχ
))
, where p(θ|η) denotes this posterior with a natural
parameter vector η, if there exists a δ > 0 such that these
assumptions are met:
1. The data X comes i.i.d. from a minimal exponential
family distribution with natural parameter θ0 ∈ Θ
2. θ0 is in the interior of Θ
3. The function A(θ) has all derivatives for θ in the inte-
rior of Θ
4. covPr(x|θ)(S(x))) is finite for θ ∈ B(θ0, δ)
5. ∃w > 0 s.t. det(covPr(x|θ)(S(x)))) > w for θ ∈
B(θ0, δ)
6. The prior Pr(θ|χ, α) is integrable and has support on
a neighborhood of θ∗
then for any mechanism generating a perturbed posterior
p˜N = p(θ|ηN + γ) against a noiseless posterior pN =
p(θ|ηN ) where γ comes from a distribution that does not
depend on the number of data observations N and has fi-
nite covariance, this limit holds:
limN→∞E[KL(p˜N ||pN )] = 0 .
Corollary 2. The Laplace mechanism on an exponen-
tial family satisfies the noise distribution requirements of
Lemma 11 when the sensitivity of the sufficient statistics is
finite and either the exponential family is minimal, or if the
exponential family parameters θ are identifiable.
These assumptions correspond to the data coming from a
distribution where the Laplace regularity assumptions hold
and the posterior satisfies the asymptotic normality given
by the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. For example, in the
beta-Bernoulli setting, these assumptions hold as long as
the success parameter p is in the open interval (0, 1). For
p = 0 or 1, the relevant parameter is not in the interior of
Θ, and the result does not apply. In the setting of learning a
normal distribution’s mean µ where the variance σ2 > 0 is
known, the assumptions of Lemma 11 always hold, as the
natural parameter space is an open set. However, Corollary
2 does not apply in this setting because the sensitivity is
infinite (unless bounds are placed on the data). Our effi-
ciency result, in Theorem 4, follows from Lemma 11 and
the Bernstein-von Mises theorem.
Theorem 4. Under the assumptions of Lemma 11,
the Laplace mechanism has an asymptotic posterior of
N (θ0, 2I−1/N) from which drawing a single sample has
an asymptotic relative efficiency of 2 in estimating θ0,
where I is the Fisher information at θ0.
Above, the asymptotic posterior refers to the normal dis-
tribution, whose variance depends on N , that the posterior
distribution approaches as N increases. This ARE result
should be contrasted to that of the exponential mechanism
(Wang et al., 2015b).
Theorem 5. The exponential mechanism applied to the ex-
ponential family with temperature parameter T ≥ 1 has an
asymptotic posterior ofN (θ∗, (1+T )I−1/N) and a single
sample has an asymptotic relative efficiency of (1 + T ) in
estimating θ∗, where I is the Fisher information at θ∗.
Here, the ARE represents the ratio between the variance of
the estimator and the optimal variance I−1/N achieved by
the posterior mean in the limit. Sampling from the posterior
itself has an ARE of 2, due to the stochasticity of sampling,
which the Laplace mechanism approach matches. These
theoretical results provide an explanation for the difference
in the behavior of these two methods asN increases seen in
Figure 2. The Laplace mechanism will eventually approach
the true posterior and the impact of privacy on accuracy will
diminish when the data size increases. However, for the
exponential mechanism with T > 1, the ratio of variances
between the sampled posterior and the true posterior given
N data points approaches (1 + T )/2, making the sampled
posterior more spread out than the true posterior even as N
grows large.
So far we have compared the ARE values for sampling,
as an apples-to-apples comparison. In reality, the Laplace
mechanism has a further advantage as it releases a full
posterior with privatized parameters, while the exponen-
tial mechanism can only release a finite number of samples
with a finite , which we discuss in Remark 1.
Remark 1. Under the the assumptions of Lemma 11, by
using the full privatized posterior instead of just a sam-
ple from it, the Laplace mechanism can release the priva-
tized posterior’s mean, which has an asymptotic relative
efficiency of 1 in estimating θ∗.
4 PRIVATE GIBBS SAMPLING
We now shift our discussion to the case of approximate
Bayesian inference. While the analysis of Dimitrakakis
et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2015b) shows that posterior
sampling is differentially private under certain conditions,
exact sampling is not in general tractable. It does not di-
rectly follow that approximate sampling algorithms such
as MCMC are also differentially private, or private at the
same privacy level. Wang et al. (2015b) give two results to-
wards understanding the privacy properties of approximate
sampling algorithms. First, they show that if the approxi-
mate sampler is “close” to the true distribution in a certain
sense, then the privacy cost will be close to that of a true
posterior sample:
Proposition 3. If procedure A which produces samples
from distribution PX is -differentially private, then any
approximate sampling procedures A′ that produces a sam-
ple from P ′X such that ‖PX − P ′X‖1 ≤ δ for any X is
(, (1 + exp()δ)-differentially private.
Unfortunately, it is not in general feasible to verify the con-
vergence of an MCMC algorithm, and so this criterion is
not generally verifiable in practice. In their second re-
sult, Wang et al. study the privacy properties of stochastic
gradient MCMC algorithms, including stochastic gradient
Langevin dynamics (SGLD) (Welling and Teh, 2011) and
its extensions. SGLD is a stochastic gradient method with
noise injected in the gradient updates which converges in
distribution to the target posterior.
In this section we study the privacy cost of MCMC, al-
lowing us to quantify the privacy of many real-world
MCMC-based Bayesian analyses. We focus on the case
of Gibbs sampling, under exponential mechanism and
Laplace mechanism approaches. By reinterpreting Gibbs
sampling as an instance of the exponential mechanism,
we obtain the “privacy for free” cost of Gibbs sampling.
Metropolis-Hastings and annealed importance sampling
also have privacy guarantees, which we show in the sup-
plementary materials.
4.1 EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM
We consider the privacy cost of a Gibbs sampler, where
data X are behind the privacy wall, current sampled val-
ues of parameters and latent variables θ = [θ1, . . . , θD] are
publicly known, and a Gibbs update is a randomized algo-
rithm which queries our private data in order to randomly
select a new value θ′l for the current variable θl. The transi-
tion kernel for a Gibbs update of θl is
T (Gibbs,l)(θ, θ′) = Pr(θ′l
∣∣θ¬l,X) , (18)
where θ¬l refers to all entries of θ except l, which are held
fixed, i.e. θ′¬l = θ¬l. This update can be understood via the
exponential mechanism:
T (Gibbs,l,)(θ, θ′) ∝ Pr(θ′l, θ¬l,X)

24 logPr(θ′
l
,θ¬l,X) ,
(19)
with utility function u(X, θ′l; θ¬l) = logPr(θ
′
l, θ¬l,X),
over the space of possible assignments to θl, holding θ¬l
fixed. A Gibbs update is therefore -differentially private,
with  = 24 logPr(θ′l, θ¬l,X). This update corresponds
to Equation 6 except that the set of responses for the expo-
nential mechanism is restricted to those where θ′¬l = θ¬l.
Note that
4 logPr(θ′l, θ¬l,X) ≤ 4 logPr(θ,X) (20)
as the worst case is computed over a strictly smaller set of
outcomes. In many cases each parameter and latent vari-
able θl is associated with only the lth data point xl, in
which case the privacy cost of a Gibbs scan can be im-
proved over simple additive composition. In this case a
random sequence scan Gibbs pass, which updates all N
θl’s exactly once, is 24 logPr(θ,X)-differentially private
by parallel composition (Song et al., 2013). Alternatively,
a random scan Gibbs sampler, which updates a random Q
out of N θl’s, is 44 logPr(θ,X)QN -differentially private
from the privacy amplification benefit of subsampling data
(Li et al., 2012).
4.2 LAPLACE MECHANISM
Suppose that the conditional posterior distribution for a
Gibbs update is in the exponential family. Having pri-
vatized the sufficient statistics arising from the data for
the likelihoods involved in each update, via Equation 16,
and publicly released them with privacy cost , we may
now perform the update by drawing a sample from the ap-
proximate conditional posterior, i.e. Equation 11 but with
S(X) =
∑N
i=1(x
(i)) replaced by Sˆ(X). Since the pri-
vatized statistics can be made public, we can also sub-
sequently draw from an approximate posterior based on
Sˆ(X) with any other prior (selected based on public infor-
mation only), without paying any further privacy cost. This
is especially valuable in a Gibbs sampling context, where
the “prior” for a Gibbs update often consists of factors from
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Figure 3: State assignments of privacy-preserving HMM
on Iraq (Laplace mechanism,  = 5).
other variables and parameters to be sampled, which are
updated during the course of the algorithm.
In particular, consider a Bayesian model where a Gibbs
sampler interacts with data only via conditional posteri-
ors and their corresponding likelihoods that are exponen-
tial family distributions. We can privatize the sufficient
statistics of the likelihood just once at the beginning of the
MCMC algorithm via the Laplace mechanism with privacy
cost , and then approximately sample from the posterior
by running the entire MCMC algorithm based on these pri-
vatized statistics without paying any further privacy cost.
This is typically much cheaper in the privacy budget than
exponential mechanism MCMC which pays a privacy cost
for every Gibbs update, as we shall see in our case study
in Section 5. The MCMC algorithm does not need to con-
verge to obtain privacy guarantees, unlike the OPS method.
This approach applies to a very broad class of models,
including Bayesian parameter learning for fully-observed
MRF and Bayesian network models. Of course, for this
technique to be useful in practice, the aggregate sufficient
statistics for each Gibbs update must be large relative to
the Laplace noise. For latent variable models, this typically
corresponds to a setting with many data points per latent
variable, such as the HMM model with multiple emissions
per timestep which we study in the next section.
5 CASE STUDY: WIKILEAKS IRAQ &
AFGHANISTAN WAR LOGS
A primary goal of this work is to establish the practical fea-
sibility of privacy-preserving Bayesian data analysis using
complex models on real-world datasets. In this section we
investigate the performance of the methods studied in this
paper for the analysis of sensitive military data. In July and
October 2010, the Wikileaks organization disclosed collec-
tions of internal U.S. military field reports from the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Both disclosures con-
tained data from between January 2004 to December 2009,
with ∼75,000 entries from the war in Afghanistan, and
∼390,000 entries from Iraq. Hillary Clinton, at that time
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Figure 4: State 1 for Iraq (type, category, casualties).
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Figure 5: State 2 for Iraq (type, category, casualties).
the U.S. Secretary of State, criticized the disclosure, stat-
ing that it “puts the lives of United States and its partners’
service members and civilians at risk.”1 These risks, and
the motivations for the leak, could potentially have been
mitigated by releasing a differentially private analysis of
the data, which protects the contents of each individual log
entry while revealing high-level trends. Note that since the
data are publicly available, although our models were dif-
ferentially private, other aspects of this manuscript such as
the evaluation may reveal certain information, as in other
works such as Wang et al. (2015a,b).
The disclosed war logs each correspond to an individual
event, and contain textual reports, as well as fields such
as coarse-grained types (friendly action, explosive hazard,
. . . ), fine-grained categories (mine found/cleared, show of
force, . . . ), and casualty counts (wounded/killed/detained)
for the different factions (Friendly, HostNation (i.e. Iraqi
and Afghani forces), Civilian, and Enemy, where the names
are relative to the U.S. military’s perspective). We use the
techniques discussed in this paper to privately infer a hid-
den Markov model on the log entries. The HMM was fit
to the non-textual fields listed above, with one timestep
per month, and one HMM chain per region code. A naive
Bayes conditional independence assumption was used in
the emission probabilities for simplicity and parameter-
count parsimony. Each field was modeled via a discrete
distribution per latent state, with casualty counts bina-
1Fallon, Amy (2010). “Iraq war logs: disclosure condemned
by Hillary Clinton and Nato.” The Guardian. Retrieved on
2/22/2016.
rized (0 versus > 0), and with wounded/killed/detained
and Friendly/HostNation features combined, respectively,
via disjunction of the binary values. This decreased the
number of features to privatize, while slightly increasing
the size of the counts per field to protect and simplifying
the model for visualization purposes. After preprocessing
to remove empty timesteps and near-empty region codes
(see the supplementary), the median number of log en-
tries per region/timestep pair was 972 for Iraq, and 58 for
Afghanistan. The number of log entries per timestep was
highly skewed for Afghanistan, due to an increase in den-
sity over time.
The models were trained via Gibbs sampling, with the tran-
sition probabilities collapsed out, following Goldwater and
Griffiths (2007). We did not collapse out the naive Bayes
parameters in order to keep the conditional likelihood in
the exponential family. The details of the model and infer-
ence algorithm are given in the supplementary material. We
trained the models for 200 Gibbs iterations, with the first
100 used for burn-in. Both privatization methods have the
same overall computational complexity as the non-private
sampler. The Laplace mechanism’s computational over-
head is paid once up-front, and did not greatly affect the
runtime, while OPS roughly doubled the runtime. For vi-
sualization purposes we recovered parameter estimates via
the posterior mean based on the latent variable assignments
of the final iteration, and we reported the most frequent la-
tent variable assignments over the non-burn-in iterations.
We trained a 2-state model on the Iraq data, and a 3-state
model for the Afghanistan data, using the Laplace approach
with total  = 5 ( = 1 for each of 5 features).
Interestingly, when given 10 states, the privacy-preserving
model only assigned substantial numbers of data points to
these 2-3 states, while a non-private HMM happily fit a
10-state model to the data. The Laplace noise therefore ap-
pears to play the role of a regularizer, consistent with the
noise being interpreted as a “random prior,” and along the
lines of noise-based regularization techniques such as (Sri-
vastava et al., 2014; van der Maaten et al., 2013), although
of course it may correspond to more regularization than we
would typically like. This phenomenon potentially merits
further study, beyond the scope of this paper.
We visualized the output of the Laplace HMM for Iraq
in Figures 3–5. State 1 shows the U.S. military perform-
ing well, with the most frequent outcomes for each fea-
ture being friendly action, cache found/cleared, and en-
emy casualties, while the U.S. military performed poorly
in State 2 (explosive hazard, IED explosion, civilian ca-
sualties). State 2 was prevalent in most regions until the
situation improved to State 1 after the troop surge strat-
egy of 2007. This transition typically occurred after troops
peaked in Sept.–Nov. 2007. The results for Afghanistan,
in the supplementary, provide a critical lens on the US mil-
itary’s performance, with enemy casualty rates (including
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Figure 6: Log-likelihood results. Left: Naive Bayes (Afghanistan). Middle: Afghanistan. Right: Iraq. For OPS, Dirichlets
were truncated at a0 = 1MKd , M = 10 or 100, where Kd = feature d’s dimensionality.
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Figure 7: State assignments for OPS privacy-preserving
HMM on Afghanistan. ( = 5, truncation point a0 =
1
100Kd
). Top: Estimate from last 100 samples. Bottom:
Estimate from last one sample.
detainments) lower than friendly/host casualties for all la-
tent states, and lower than civilian casualties in 2 of 3 states.
We also evaluated the methods at prediction. A uniform
random 10% of the timestep/region pairs were held out for
10 train/test splits, and we reported average test likelihoods
over the splits. We estimated test log-likelihood for each
split by averaging the test likelihood over the burned-in
samples (Laplace mechanism), or using the final sample
(OPS). All methods were given 10 latent states, and  was
varied between 0.1 and 10. We also considered a naive
Bayes model, equivalent to a 1-state HMM. The Laplace
mechanism was superior to OPS for the naive Bayes model,
for which the statistics are corpus-wide counts, corre-
sponding to a high-data regime in which our asymptotic
analysis was applicable. OPS was competitive with the
Laplace mechanism for the HMM on Afghanistan, where
the amount of data was relatively low. For the Iraq dataset,
where there was more data per timestep, the Laplace mech-
anism outperformed OPS, particularly in the high-privacy
regime. For OPS, privacy at  is only guaranteed if MCMC
has converged. Otherwise, from Section 4.1, the worst case
is an impractical (Gibbs) ≤ 400 (200 iterations of la-
tent variable and parameter updates with worst-case cost
). OPS only releases one sample, which harmed the co-
herency of the visualization for Afghanistan, as latent states
of the final sample were noisy relative to an estimate based
on all 100 post burn-in samples (Figure 7). Privatizing the
Gibbs chain at a privacy cost of (Gibbs) would avoid this.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper studied the practical limitations of using poste-
rior sampling to obtain privacy “for free.” We explored an
alternative based on the Laplace mechanism, and analyzed
it both theoretically and empirically. We illustrated the
benefits of the Laplace mechanism for privacy-preserving
Bayesian inference to analyze sensitive war records. The
study of privacy-preserving Bayesian inference is only just
beginning. We envision extensions of these techniques to
other approximate inference algorithms, as well as their
practical application to sensitive real-world data sets. Fi-
nally, we have argued that asymptotic efficiency is impor-
tant in a privacy context, leading to an open question: how
large is the class of private methods that are asymptotically
efficient?
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Figure 8: An adversary greedily selects data points to add
to a dataset to increase the dataset-specific privacy cost  of
posterior sampling via the exponential mechanism (OPS).
A ADVERSARIAL DATA EXPERIMENT
In this appendix we describe an additional simulation ex-
periment which supplements the analysis performed in the
main manuscript. Wang et al. (2015b)’s analysis finds that
the privacy cost of posterior sampling does not directly im-
prove with the number of data points N , unless the analyst
deliberately modifies the posterior by changing the temper-
ature before sampling. In Figure 8 we report an experi-
ment showing that this result is not just a limitation of the
analysis: there do exist cases where the dataset-specific pri-
vacy cost of posterior sampling can approach the exponen-
tial mechanism worst case of  = 24 logPr(θ,X) as the
number of observations N increases.
In the experiment, we consider a beta distribution poste-
rior, symmetrically truncated at a0 = 0.1, with Bernoulli
observations. We simulate an adversary who greedily se-
lects data points to add to a dataset to increase the dataset-
specific privacy cost  of posterior sampling. The dataset-
specific “local” privacy parameter  is computed via a
grid search over the Bernoulli success parameter p and
Bernoulli outcomes x, x′, for the case where the adver-
sary adds a success, or a failure, and the adversary se-
lects the success/failure outcome with the highest local .
The adversary is able to make the dataset-specific  ap-
proach the worst case by manipulating the partition func-
tion of the posterior. The exponential mechanism’s worst
case for posterior sampling,  = 24 logPr(θ,X), cor-
responds to a sum of two cost terms. We must pay
a cost of 4 logPr(θ,X) from to the difference of log-
likelihood terms, as we can always draw the worst-case θ
(e.g., when p is on the truncation boundary), plus another
4 logPr(θ,X) in the worst case due to the difference of
log partition-functions terms, which the adversary can al-
ter up to the worst case, as they do in Figure 8. This is
described formally in the supplementary of (Wang et al.,
2015b).
B PROOFS OF THEORETICAL
RESULTS
Here we provide proofs for the results presented in Section
3.3.
B.1 PROOF OF LAPLACE MECHANISM
ASYMPTOTIC KL-DIVERGENCE
Our results hold specifically over the class of exponen-
tial families. A family of distributions parameterized by
θ which has the form
Pr(x|θ) = h(x) exp
(
θᵀS(x)−A(θ)
)
(21)
is said to be an exponential family. Breaking down this
structure into its parts, θ is a vector known as the natural
parameters for the distribution and lies in some space Θ.
S(x) represents a vector of sufficient statistics that fully
capture the information needed to determine how likely x is
under this distribution. A(θ) represents the log-normalizer,
a term used to make this a probability distribution sum to
one over all possibilities of x. h(x) is a base measure for
this family, independent of which distribution in the family
is used.
As we are interested in learning θ, we are considering al-
gorithms that generate a posterior distribution for θ. The
exponential families always have a conjugate prior family
which is itself an exponential family. When speaking of
these prior and posterior distributions, θ becomes the ran-
dom variable and we introduce a new vector of natural pa-
rameters η in a spaceM to parameterize these distributions.
To ease notation, we will express this conjugate prior expo-
nential family as Pr(θ|η) = f(θ) exp
(
ηᵀT (θ) − B(η)
)
,
which is simply a relabelling of the exponential family
structure. The posterior from this conjugate prior is often
written in an equivalent form
Pr(θ|X, χ, α) ∝ g(θ)N+α exp
(
θᵀ
(∑N
i=1 S(x
(i)) +
αχ
))
,
where the vector χ and the scalar α together specify the
vector η of natural parameters for this distribution. From
the interaction of χ, α, and X on the posterior, one can see
that this prior acts like α observations with average suffi-
cient statistics χ have already been observed. This parame-
terization with χ and α has many nice intuitive properties,
but our proofs center around the natural parameter vector η
for this prior.
These two forms for the posterior can be reconciled by
letting η = (αχ +
∑N
i=1 S(x
(i)), N + α) and T (θ) =
(θ,−A(θ)). This definition for the natural parameters η
and sufficient statistics T (θ) fully specify the exponential
family the posterior resides in, withB(η) defined as the ap-
propriate log-normalizer for this distribution (and f(θ) = 1
is merely a constant). We note that the space of T (Θ) is
not the full space Rd+1, as the last component of T (θ) is
a function of the previous components. Plugging in these
expressions for η and T (θ) we get the following form for
the conjugate prior:
Pr(θ|X, χ, α) = exp
(
θᵀ(αχ+
N∑
i=1
S(x(i)))
− (N + α)A(θ)
−B(η)
)
. (22)
We begin by defining minimal exponential families, a spe-
cial class of exponential families with nice properties. To
be minimal, the sufficient statistics must be linearly inde-
pendent. We will later relax the requirement that we con-
sider only minimal exponential families.
Definition 1. An exponential family of distributions gen-
erating a random variable x ∈ X with S(x) ∈ Rd is said
to be minimal if 6 ∃φ ∈ Rd, φ 6= 0 s.t. ∃c ∈ R s.t. ∀x ∈ X
φᵀS(x) = c.
Next we present a few simple algebraic results of minimal
exponential families.
Lemma 4. For two distributions p, q from the same mini-
mal exponential family,
KL(p||q) = A(θq)−A(θp)− (θq − θp)ᵀ∇A(θp) (23)
where θp, θq are the natural parameters of p and q, and
A(θ) is the log-normalizer for the exponential family.
Lemma 5. A minimal exponential family distribution sat-
isfies these equalities:
∇A(θ) = EPr(x|θ)[S(x)]
∇2A(θ) = covPr(x|θ)(S(x)) .
Lemma 6. For a minimal exponential family distribution,
its log-normalizer A(θ) is a strictly convex function over
the natural parameters. This implies a bijection between θ
and EPr(x|θ)[S(x)].
These are standard results coming from some algebraic ma-
nipulations as seen in (Brown, 1986), and we omit the proof
of these lemmas. Lemma 6 immediately leads to a useful
corollary about minimal families and their conjugate prior
families.
Corollary 7. For a minimal exponential family distribu-
tion, the conjugate prior family given in equation (22) is
also minimal.
PROOF:
T (θ) = (θ,−A(θ)) forms the sufficient statistics for the
conjugate prior. Since A(θ) is strictly convex, there can
be no linear relationship between the components of θ and
A(θ). Definition 1 applies. 
Our next result looks at sufficient conditions for getting a
KL divergence of 0 in the limit when adding a finite per-
turbance vector γ to the natural parameters. The limit is
taken overN , which will later be tied to the amount of data
used in forming the posterior. As we now discuss posterior
distributions also forming exponential families, our natu-
ral parameters will now be denoted by η and the random
variables are now θ.
Lemma 8. Let p(θ|η) denote the distribution from an ex-
ponential family of natural parameter η, and let γ be a con-
stant vector of the same dimensionality as η, and let ηN be
a sequence of natural parameters. If for every ζ on the line
segment connecting η and η+ γ we have the spectral norm
||∇2B(ζ)|| < DN for some constant DN , then
KL(p(θ|ηN + γ)||p(θ|ηN )) ≤ DN ||γ|| .
PROOF: This follows from noticing that equation (23) in
Lemma 4 becomes the first-order Taylor approximation
of B(ηN ) centered at B(ηN + γ). From Taylor’s the-
orem, there exists α between ηN and ηN + γ such that
1
2γ
ᵀ∇2B(α)γ is equal to the error of this approximation.
B(ηN ) = B(ηN+γ)+(−γ)ᵀ∇B(ηN+γ)+1
2
γᵀ∇2B(α)γ
(24)
From rearranging equation (23),
B(ηN + γ) = B(ηN )−KL(p(θ|ηN + γ)||p(θ|ηN ))
+(γ)ᵀ∇B(ηn + γ)
(25)
Using this substitution in (24) gives
B(ηN ) = B(ηN )−KL(p(θ|ηN+γ)||p(θ|ηN ))+1
2
γᵀ∇2B(α)γ .
(26)
Solving for KL(p(θ|ηN + γ)||p(θ|ηN )) then gives the de-
sired result:
KL(p(θ|ηN+γ)||p(θ|ηN )) = 1
2
γᵀ∇2B(α)γ ≤ DN ||γ|| .

This provides the heart of our results: If ||∇2B(ζ)|| is small
for all ζ connecting η and η+ γ, then we can conclude that
KL(p(θ|ηN + γ)||p(θ|ηN )) is small with respect to ||γ||.
We wish to show that for ηN arising from observingN data
points we have DN approaching 0 as N grows. To achieve
this, we will analyze a relationship between the norm of
the natural parameter η and the covariance of the distribu-
tion it parameterizes. This relationship shows that posteri-
ors with plenty of observed data have low covariance over
T (θ), which permits us to use Lemma 8 to bound the KL
divergence of our perturbed posteriors. Before we reach
this relationship, first we prove that our posteriors have a
well-defined mode, as our later relationship will require
this mode to be well-behaved.
Lemma 9. Let Pr(x|θ) = h(x) exp
(
θᵀS(x) − A(θ)
)
be a likelihood function for θ and let there be a conjugate
prior Pr(θ|η) = f(θ) exp
(
ηᵀT (θ) − B(η)
)
, where both
distributions are minimal exponential families. Let M be
the space of natural parameters η, and Θ be the space of
θ. Furthermore, assume η is the parameterization arising
from the natural conjugate prior, such that η = (αχ, α). If
the following conditions hold:
1. η is in the interior of M
2. α > 0
3. A(θ) is a real, continuous, and differentiable
4. B(η) exists, the distribution Pr(θ|η) is normalizable.
then
argmaxθ∈Θη
ᵀT (θ) = θ∗η
is a well-defined function of η, and θ∗η is in the interior of
Θ.
PROOF:
Using our structure for the conjugate prior from (22), we
can expand the expression ηᵀT (θ).
ηᵀT (θ) = αχᵀθ − αA(θ)
We note that the first term is linear in θ, and that by mini-
mality and Lemma 6, A(θ) is strictly convex. This implies
ηᵀT (θ) is strictly concave over θ. Thus any interior local
maximum must also be the unique global maximum.
The gradient of with ηᵀT (θ) respect to θ is simple to com-
pute.
∇(ηᵀT (θ)) = αχᵀ − α∇A(θ)
This expression can be set to zero, and solving for θ∗η shows
it must satisfy
∇A(θ∗η) = χ . (27)
We remark by Lemma 5 that ∇A(θ∗η) is equal to
EPr(x|θ∗η)[S(x)], and so this is the θ that generates a dis-
tribution with mean χ.
By the strict concavity, this is sufficient to prove θ∗η is a
unique local maximizer and thus the global maximum.
To see that θ∗η must be in the interior of Θ, we use the
fact that A(θ) is continuously differentiable. This means
∇A(θ) is a continuous function of θ. Since η is in the inte-
rior of M , we can construct an open neighborhood around
χ. The preimage of an open set under a continuous function
is also an open set, so this implies an open neighborhood
exists around θ∗η .

Now that we know θ∗η is well defined for η in the interior
of M , we can express our relationship on high magnitude
posterior parameters and the covariance of the distribution
over T (θ) they generate.
Lemma 10. Let Pr(x|θ) = h(x) exp
(
θᵀS(x) − A(θ)
)
be a likelihood function for θ and let there be a conjugate
prior Pr(θ|η) = f(θ) exp
(
ηᵀT (θ) − B(η)
)
, where both
distributions are minimal exponential families. Let M be
the space of natural parameters η, and Θ be the space of
θ. Furthermore, assume η is the parameterization arising
from the natural conjugate prior, such that η = (αχ, α).
If ∃η0, δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0 such that the conditions of Lemma
9 hold for η ∈ B(η0, δ1), and we have these additional
assumptions,
1. the cone {kη′|k > 1, η′ ∈ B(η0, δ1)} lies entirely in
M
2. A(θ) is differentiable of all orders
3. ∃P s.t. ∀θ ∈ ∪
η′∈B(η0,δ1)B(θ∗η′ , δ2) all partial deriva-
tives up to order 7 of A(θ) have magnitude bounded
by P
4. ∃w > 0 such that ∀θ ∈ ∪
η′∈B(η0,δ1)B(θ∗η′ , δ2) we
have det(∇2A(θ)) > w
then there exists C,K such that for k > K the following
bound holds ∀η ∈ B(η0, δ1):
||cov(T (θ)|kη)|| < Ck .
PROOF:
This result follows from the Laplace approximation method
for B(η) =
∫
Θ
eη
ᵀT (θ)dθ. The inner details of this approx-
imation are show in Lemma 14. Here we show that our
setting satisfies all the regularity assumptions for this ap-
proximation. First we define functions s(θ, η) and Fk(η).
s(θ, η) = ηᵀT (θ) = αχᵀθ − αA(θ) (28)
Fk(η) = B(kη)
=
∫
Θ
ekη
ᵀT (θ)dθ
=
∫
Θ
eks(θ,η)dθ (29)
With these definitions, we may now begin to check the as-
sumptions of Lemma 14 hold. We copy these assumptions
below, with a substitution of θ for φ and η for Y . The full
details of Lemma 14 can be found at the end of section B.1.
1. φ∗Y = argmaxφ∈Ms(φ, Y ) = g(Y ), a function of Y .
2. φ∗Y ′ is in the interior of M for all Y
′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1).
3. g(Y ) is continuously differentiable over the neighbor-
hood B(Y0, δ1).
4. s(φ, Y ′) has derivatives of all orders for Y ′ ∈
B(Y0, δ1),φ ∈ B(φ∗Y ′ , δ2) and all partial derivatives
up to order 7 are bounded by some constant P on this
neighborhood.
5. ∃w > 0 such that ∀Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1),∀φ ∈ B(φ∗Y ′ , δ2)
we have det(∇2φs(φ, Y )) > w.
6. F1(Y ′) exists for Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1), the integral is finite.
We now show these conditions hold one-by-one. Let η de-
note an arbitrary element of B(η0, δ).
1. θ∗η is a well-defined function (Lemma 9).
2. θ∗η is in the interior of Θ (Lemma 9).
3. g(η) follows the inverse of ∇A(θ) : Rd → Rd.
This vector mapping has a Jacobian ∇2A(θ) which
assumption 4 guarantees has non-zero determinant on
this neighborhood. This satisfies the Inverse Function
Theorem to show g(η) is continuously differentiable.
4. s(θ, η) has derivatives of all orders, and are suitably
bounded as s is composed of a linear term and the
differentiable function A(θ), where we have bounded
the derivatives of A(θ).
5. Assumption 4 from this lemma translates directly.
6. F1(η) = B(η) which exists by virtue of η being in the
space of valid natural parameters.
This completes all the requirements of Lemma 14, which
guarantees the existence of C and K such that for any k >
K and any η ∈ B(η0, δ1), if we let ψ denote kη, we have:
||∇2ψB(ψ)|| = ||∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k)|| < Ck .
We conclude by noting that ∇2ψB(ψ) is the covariance of
the posterior with parameterization ψ = kη.

Now that all our machinery is in place, it remains to be seen
under what conditions the posterior satisfies the conditions
of the previous Lemmas, along with extending to the case
where γ is a random variable, and not just a fixed finite
vector.
Lemma 11. For a minimal exponential family given
a conjugate prior, where the posterior takes the form
Pr(θ|X, χ, α) ∝ g(θ)n+α exp
(
θᵀ
(∑n
i=1 S(x
(i)) +
αχ
))
, where p(θ|η) denotes this posterior with a natural
parameter vector η, if there exists a δ > 0 such that these
assumptions are met:
1. the data X comes i.i.d. from a minimal exponential
family distribution with natural parameter θ0 ∈ Θ
2. θ0 is in the interior of Θ
3. the function A(θ) has all derivatives for θ in the inte-
rior of Θ
4. covPr(x|θ)(S(x))) is finite for θ ∈ B(θ0, δ)
5. ∃w > 0 s.t. det(covPr(x|θ)(S(x)))) > w for θ ∈
B(θ0, δ)
6. the prior Pr(θ|χ, α) is integrable and has support on
a neighborhood of θ∗
then for any mechanism generating a perturbed posterior
p˜N = p(θ|ηN + γ) against a noiseless posterior pN =
p(θ|ηN ) where γ comes from a distribution that does not
depend on the number of data observations N and has fi-
nite covariance, this limit holds:
limN→∞E[KL(p˜N ||pN )] = 0 .
PROOF:
We begin by fixing the randomness of the noise γ that the
mechanism will add to the natural parameters of the poste-
rior.
We wish to show that the KL divergence goes to zero in
the limit, which we will achieve by showing that for large
enough data sizes, both the perturbed and unperturbed pos-
teriors lie w.h.p. in a region where we can use Lemmas 8
and 10 apply.
To compute the posterior, after drawing a collection X of
N data observations, we compute the sum of the sufficient
statistics and add them to the prior’s parameters.
ηN =
(
αχ+
∑
S(x(i)), α+N
)
ηN is a random variable depending on the data observa-
tions X. To analyze how it behaves, a couple related ran-
dom variables will be defined, all implicitly conditioned on
the constant θ0. Let Y denote a random variable match-
ing the distribution of a single observation, and let UN =
1
N
∑
S(x(i)) which has covariance 1N cov(S(Y)). The ex-
pected value for UN is of course E[S(Y)].
By a vector version of the Chebyshev inequality for a ran-
dom vector U, (Chen, 2007)
Pr
(
(U− E[U])ᵀ(cov(U))−1(U− E[U]) ≥ ν
)
,
≤ d
ν
, (30)
where d is the dimensionality of U. Using the spectral
norm ||(cov(UN ))−1|| and the l2 norm ||UN − E[UN ]||
with some some rearrangement, we can show the follow-
ing inequalities. We note that the covariance of UN must
be invertible, since the covariance of Y is invertible by as-
sumption (5).
Pr
(
||UN −E[UN ]|| · ||(cov(UN ))−1|| ≥ ν
)
≤ d
ν
(31)
Pr
(
||UN − E[UN ]|| ≥ ν||cov(UN )||
)
≤ d
ν
(32)
Pr
(
||UN − E[S(Y)]|| ≥ ν
N
||cov(Y)||
)
≤ d
ν
(33)
Thus for any  > 0, τ > 0, there existsN,τ such that when
the number of data observations N exceeds N,τ
Pr
(||UN − E[Y]|| ≥ ) ≤ τ . (34)
We now define two modified vectors of natural parameters
ηa =
ηN
N = (UN , 1) +
1
N (αχ, α) and ηb =
ηN+γ
N =
(Un, 1) +
1
N (αχ, α) +
1
N γ. From these definitions, one
can see
E[ηa] = (E[Y], 1) +
1
N
(αχ, α)
E[ηb] = E[ηa] +
1
N
γ
||ηa − (E[Y], 1)|| ≤ ||(UN , 1)− (E[Y], 1)||+ 1
N
||αχ||
(35)
||ηb − (E[Y], 1)|| ≤ ||(UN , 1)− (E[Y], 1)||
+
1
N
(||αχ||+ ||γ||). (36)
From the concentration bound in (34), we know ηa and ηb
can be made to lie w.h.p. in a region near their expectations
with large N , and we wish to show this region satisfies all
the regularity assumptions seen in Lemma 10. Lemma 9
states θ∗η is a continuously differentiable function of η. Let
it be denoted by the function r(η). For η0 = (E[Y], 1), we
see from equation (27) that r(η0) = θ0.
The preimage r−1
(B(θ0, δ)) is an open set, since it is the
continuous preimage of an open set. Thus there exists δ′
such that B(η0, δ′) ⊂ r−1(B(θ0, δ/2)).
We may now pick  ≤ δ′/2 and let N ′δ′,τ =
max
(
2
δ′ (||γ||+ ||αχ||), N,τ
)
. When n > N ′δ′,τ , we have
1
N ||αχ||+ 1N ||γ|| ≤ δ′/2 and (34), (35),(36) together show
the following:
Pr(ηa 6∈ B(η0, δ′) ∨ ηb 6∈ B(η0, δ′)) ≤ τ . (37)
With high probability, ηa and ηb both lie in a neighbor-
hood of η0. Further, all η in this neighborhood have modes
θ∗η ∈ B(θ0, δ), a region that assumptions (4) and (5) tell us
is well-behaved. The assignment δ1 = δ′ and δ2 = δ/2
satisfies the conditions for Lemma 10 with assumptions
(2),(3),(4),(5),(6) serving to round out the rest of the reg-
ularity assumptions of Lemma 10 with trivial translations.
By the construction, we have ηN = Nηa and ηN + γ =
Nηb. For any ζ on the line segment connecting ηN and
ηN + γ, we have ζ = Nηc for some ηc on the line segment
connecting ηa and ηb.
Therefore by Lemma 10, there exists aK and a C such that
if N > K we have ||cov(T (θ)|ζ)|| < CN . This bound can
be used in Lemma 8 with DN = O(1/N) to see
KL(p˜N ||pN ) = O(1/N)C||γ||
whenever N > max(N ′δ′,τ ,K) with arbitrarily high prob-
ability 1 − τ . Letting τ approach 0, we can extend this to
the expectation over the randomness of X, as with proba-
bility 1 our random variables will lie in the region where
this inequality holds.
lim sup
N→∞
EX[KL(p˜N ||pN )] = 0 (38)
Equation (38) is w.r.t. to a fixed γ, but the desired result is
an expectation over γ and X. First, let us express this ex-
pectation in terms of γ and X. Letting DN = O(1/N) de-
note the bound used in Lemma 8 and N being sufficiently
large:
E[KL(p˜N ||pN )] =
∫
EX
[
KL(p˜N ||pN )|γ
]
dPr(γ)
≤
∫
DN ||γ||dPr(γ).
(39)
The assumption that γ comes from a distribution of finite
variance ensures the right side of (39) is integrable. By
an application of Fatou’s Lemma, the following inequality
holds:
∫
lim sup
N→∞
EX
[
KL(p˜N ||pN )|γ
]
dPr(γ)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
∫
EX
[
KL(p˜N ||pN )|γ
]
dPr(γ). (40)
The left hand side has been shown to be zero by equations
(38) and (39), and the right hand side is bounded below
by 0 since KL divergences are never negative. Thus this
inequality suffices to show the limit is zero and prove the
desired result.

Corollary 12. The Laplace mechanism on an exponen-
tial family satisfies the noise distribution requirements of
Lemma 11 when the sensitivity of the sufficient statistics is
finite and either the exponential family is minimal, or if the
exponential family parameters θ are identifiable.
PROOF: If the exponential family is already minimal, this
result is trivial. If it is not minimal, there exists a mini-
mal parameterization. We wish to show adding noise to the
non-minimal parameters is equivalent to adding differently
distributed noise to the minimal parameterization, and this
new noise distribution also satisfies the noise distribution
requirements of Lemma 11: the noise distribution does not
depend on N and it has finite covariance.
Let us explicitly construct a minimal parameterization for
this family of distributions. If the exponential family is
not minimal, this means the d dimensions of the sufficient
statistics S(x) of the data are not fully linearly indepen-
dent. Let S(x)j be the jth component of S(x) and k be the
maximal number of linearly independent sufficient statis-
tics, and without loss of generality assume they are the first
k components. Let S˜(x) be the vector of these k linearly
independent components.
For ∀j > k, ∀x∃φj ∈ Rk such that S(x)j = φj ·S˜(x)+zj .
We wish to build a minimal exponential family distribution
that is identical to the original one, but is parameterized
only by S˜(x) as the sufficient statistics and some θ˜ as the
natural parameters. For these two distributions to be equiv-
alent for all x, it suffices to have equality on the exponents.
(θᵀS(x)−A(θ)) = (θ˜ᵀS˜(x)− A˜(θ˜)) (41)
Examining the difference of the two sides, we get
θᵀS(x)− θ˜ᵀS˜(x)−A(θ) + A˜(θ˜)
=
k∑
j=1
(θj − θ˜j)S(x)j +
d∑
j=k+1
θjS(x)j −A(θ) + A˜(θ˜).
(42)
Using the known linear dependence for j > k, this can be
rewritten as
k∑
j=1
(θj − θ˜j)S(x)j +
d∑
j=k+1
θj(φj · S˜(x) + zj)
−A(θ) + A˜(θ˜) (43)
=
k∑
j=1
(θj − θ˜j)S(x)j +
d∑
j=k+1
θj(φj · S˜(x))
+
d∑
j=k+1
θjzj −A(θ) + A˜(θ˜). (44)
Now since S˜(x) is merely the first k components of
S(x), the first two sums of (44) are each simply dot
products of S˜(x) and can be combined as (θ[k] − θ˜ +∑d
j=k+1 θjφj)
ᵀS˜(x) where θ[k] is the vector of the first
k components of θ. We can force equation (41) to hold by
choosing θ˜ and A˜(θ˜) appropriately to set equation (44) to
zero.
θ˜ = θ[k] +
∑d
j=k+1 θjφj
A˜(θ˜) = −∑dj=k+1 θjzj +A(θ)
We note that this requires A˜(θ˜) to truly be a function de-
pending only on θ˜, but we have written it in terms of θ
instead. This is justifiable by the assumption that the nat-
ural parameters θ are identifiable, that is each distribution
over x is associated with just one θ ∈ Θ. This means there
is a bijection from θ and θ˜, which ensures A˜(θ˜) is a well-
defined function.
This suffices to characterize the way the additional natural
parameters affect the parameters of the equivalent minimal
system. Any additive noise to a component θj translates
linearly to additive noise on the components θ˜j , meaning
the Laplace mechanism’s noise distribution on the non-
minimal parameter space still corresponds to some noise
distribution on the minimal parameters that does not de-
pend on the data size N , and it still has a finite covariance.
If the minimal exponential family tends towards a KL di-
vergence of zero, the equivalent non-minimal exponential
family must as well. 
Theorem B.1. Under the assumptions of Lemma 11,
the Laplace mechanism has an asymptotic posterior of
N (θ0, 2I−1/N) from which drawing a single sample has
an asymptotic relative efficiency of 2 in estimating θ0,
where I is the Fisher information at θ0.
PROOF:
The assumptions of Lemma 11 match the Laplace regular-
ity assumptions under which asymptotic normality holds,
and we know that the unperturbed posterior pN converges
to N (θ∗, 2I−1/N) under the Bernstein-von Mises theo-
rem (Kass et al., 1990). If p˜N is the posterior of the
Laplace mechanism for a fixed randomness, then we have
limN→∞KL(p˜N ||pN ) = 0 and p˜N must converge to the
same distribution as pN . From this it is clear that samples
from pN and from p˜N both have an asymptotic relative ef-
ficiency of 2. We once again argue that if this asymptotic
behavior holds for any fixed randomness of the Laplace
mechanism, it also holds for the Laplace mechanism as a
whole. 
To show the previous results, we relied on some mathemat-
ical results involving the covariances of posteriors after ob-
serving a large amount of data. We still need to show these
bounds on the covariances, which will be accomplished by
adapting existing Laplace approximation methods. Before
we get there, we will need one quick result about convex
functions with a positive definite Hessian in order to per-
form the approximation:
Lemma 13. Let f(y) : Rd → R be a strictly convex
function with minimum at y∗. If ∇2f(y∗) is positive def-
inite and ∇3f(y) exists everywhere, then for any c > 0
there exists b > 0 such that |f(y) − f(y∗)| ≤ b implies
||y − y∗|| ≤ c.
PROOF:
By the existence of ∇3f(y) and thus the continuity of
∇2f(y), we know there exists a positive δ < c and aw > 0
such that y ∈ B(y∗, δ) implies ∇2f(y) − wI is positive
semi-definite, where I is the identity matrix. (i.e. the spec-
tral norm ||∇2f(y)|| ≥ w)
As y∗ is the global minimum, we know the gradient is 0 at
y∗. Thus for y ∈ B(y∗, δ) this leads to a Taylor expansion
of the form
f(y) = f(y∗) + (y − y∗)1
2
∇2f(y′)(y − y∗)ᵀ
≥ f(y∗) + w
2
||y − y∗|| (45)
for some y′ on the line segment connecting y and y∗. The
inequality follows from the second derivative being posi-
tive definite on this neighborhood.
Consider the set Q = {y s.t. ||y − y∗|| = }. By equation
(45) we know for y ∈ Q we have |f(y)− f(y∗)| ≥ w2 if
 ≤ δ.
For any y 6∈ B(y∗, δ), there exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1− t)y∗ + ty ∈ Qδ by the continuity of the norm.
By strict convexity, we know
tf(y) + (1− t)f(y∗) > f(ty + (1− t)y∗)
f(y) >
1
t
f(ty + (1− t)y∗) + t− 1
t
f(y∗)
f(y)− f(y∗) > 1
t
f(ty + (1− t)y∗)− 1
t
f(y∗).
If we let t satisfy (1−t)y∗+ty ∈ Qδ we know t = δ/||y−
y∗|| ≤ 1. Substituting with (45) we get
f(y)− f(y∗) > (w/2)δ + f(y
∗)
t
− 1
t
f(y∗) =
wδ
2t
≥ wδ
2
.
Thus if we let b = wδ2 , we see ||y − y∗|| > c implies|f(y)− f(y∗)| > b.
The desired result then follows as the contrapositive.

Lemma 13 will be used to demonstrate a regularity assump-
tion required in the next lemma, which performs all the
heavy lifting in using the Laplace approximation. Lemma
14 adapts a previous argument about Laplace approxima-
tions of a posterior. This adapted Laplace approximation
argument forms the core of Lemma 10, which allows us
to see the covariance of posteriors shrink as more data is
observed.
Lemma 14. Let s(φ, Y ) be a functionM ×U → R, where
M is the space of φ and U is the space of Y .
For functions of the form Fk(Y ) =
∫
φ∈M e
ks(φ,Y )dφ, if
the following regularity assumptions hold for some δ1 > 0,
δ2 > 0, Y0 ∈M :
1. φ∗Y = argmaxφ∈Ms(φ, Y ) = g(Y ), a function of Y
2. φ∗Y ′ is in the interior of M for all Y
′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1)
3. g(Y ) is continuously differentiable over the neighbor-
hood B(Y0, δ1)
4. s(φ, Y ′) has derivatives of all orders for Y ′ ∈
B(Y0, δ1),φ ∈ B(φ∗Y ′ , δ2) and all partial derivatives
up to order 7 are bounded by some constant P on this
neighborhood
5. ∃w > 0 such that ∀Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1),∀φ ∈ B(φ∗Y ′ , δ2)
we have det(∇2φs(φ, Y )) > w
6. F1(Y ′) exists for Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1), the integral is finite
then there exists C and K such that for any k > K and
any Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ1), letting ψ = kY ′, the spectral norm
||∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k)|| < Ck .
PROOF:
Our goal here is to bound ||∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k)||, which we
will achieve by characterizing Fk(ψ/k) and analyzing its
derivatives.
We will be using standard Laplace approximation methods
seen in (Kass et al., 1990) to explore Fk(ψ). To begin, we
must show our assumptions satisfy the regularity assump-
tions for the approximation.
For a fixed Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ), from condition 5 we know
there exists a neighborhood around φ∗Y where ∇2φs(φ, Y )
is positive definite. For δ′ > 0, let Qδ′,Y = {φ ∈
M s.t. ||φ−φ∗Y || ≤ δ′}. By using Lemma 13 we can verify
the following expression for any δ′ ∈ (0, δ):
lim sup
k→∞
sup
φ6∈Qδ′,Y
s(φ, Y )− s(φ∗Y , Y ) < 0. (46)
Note that the right hand side does not depend on k, and
Lemma 13 guarantees a non-zero bound for the right hand
side for any δ′ ∈ (0, δ). Equation (46) exactly matches
condition (iii)′ of Kass, and its intuitive meaning is that for
any δ′, there exists sufficiently large k such that the integral
Fk is negligible outside the region Qδ′ .
Conditions (4),(5),(6) also match directly the conditions
given by Kass, though we note we require even higher
derivatives to be bounded or present. These extra deriva-
tives will be used later to extend the argument given by
Kass to suit our purposes and give a uniform bound across
a neighborhood.
Theorem 1 of (Kass et al., 1990) gives the following result,
when we set their b to the constant 1:
Fk(Y ) = (2pi)
m
2 [det(k∇2s(φ∗Y , Y )]−
1
2 exp(−ks(φ∗Y , Y ))Z(kY )
(47)
Z(kY ) = 1 +
1
k
(
1
72
∑
(∇3φs(φ∗Y , Y ))(pqr)(∇3s(φ∗Y , Y ))(def)µ6pqrdef
− 1
24
∑
(∇4s(φ∗Y , Y ))(defg)µ4defg
)
+O(k−2),
(48)
where m is the dimensionality of Y , µ6pqrdef and µ
4
defg
are the sixth and fourth central moments of a multivari-
ate Gaussian with covariance matrix (∇2s(φ∗Y , Y ))−1. All
sums are written in the Einstein summation notation. We
remark that the O(k−2) error term of this approximation
also depends on kY .
What we are really interested in is the quantity
∇2ψ logFk(ψ) evaluated at ψ = kY . We take the logarithm
of (47):
logFk(ψ/k) = log
(
(2pi)
m
2 [det(k∇2s(φ∗Y , Y )]−
1
2
· exp(−ks(φ∗Y , Y ))Z(ψ)
)
= log
(
(2pi)
m
2
)− 1
2
log
(
[det(k∇2s(φ∗Y , Y ))]
)
− ks(φ∗Y , Y ) + log(Z(ψ)). (49)
We define new functions s˜0, s˜1, s˜2 to simplify the analysis.
s˜0(Y ) = s(φ
∗
Y , Y ) = s(g(Y ), Y ) (50)
s˜1(Y ) = ∇φs(φ∗Y , Y ) = ∇φs(g(Y ), Y ) (51)
s˜2(Y ) = ∇2φs(φ∗Y , Y ) = ∇2φs(g(Y ), Y ) (52)
By assumptions (3) and (4) we know these functions are
continuously differentiable on B(Y0, δ1) as they are the
composition of continuously differentiable functions on the
compact set B(Y0, δ1).
We next look at the first derivative of (49). We remark that
the partial derivatives of log det(X) are given by X−ᵀ.
∇ψ logFk(ψ/k) =∇ψ[−1
2
log
(
[det(ks˜2(ψ/k)]
)
]
−∇ψ[ks˜0(ψ/k)] +∇ψ log(Z(ψ))
=− 1
2
(ks˜2(ψ/k)))
−ᵀ 1
k
+ s˜1(ψ/k) +
∇ψ(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
(53)
Now that we have an expression for ∇ψ logFk(ψ/k) , we
take yet another derivative w.r.t. to ψ to get our desired∇2ψ .
∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k) =∇ψ[−
1
2
(ks˜2(ψ/k)))
−ᵀ 1
k
]
+∇ψ[s˜1(ψ/k)]
+∇ψ[∇ψ(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
] (54)
Let us consider each of the three terms on the right side
of (54) in isolation. For the first term, we introduce yet
another function s˜−2(Y ), the composition of s˜2 with the
matrix inversion.
s˜−2(Y ) = (s˜2(Y ))−1
With this new function in hand, we further condense the
first term of (54).
∇ψ[−1
2
(ks˜2(ψ/k)))
−ᵀ 1
k
] =∇ψ[− 1
2k
(s˜−2(ψ/k)))
1
k
]
=− 1
2k3
∇Y s˜−2(ψ/k)
=O(k−3) (55)
We previously remarked that s˜2 is continuously differen-
tiable on the compact set B(Y0, δ1). Condition (5) informs
us that s˜2(Y ) is bounded away from being a singular ma-
trix on B(Y0, δ1) , so the matrix inversion is also uniformly
continuous on this compact set. This means ∇Y s˜−2(ψ/k)
has a finite supremum over B(Y0, δ1) and thus we can say
this term is O(k−3) uniformly on this neighborhood.
Next we consider the second term of (54).
∇ψ[s˜1(ψ/k)] = 1
k
s˜2(ψ/k) = O(k
−1) (56)
From the continuity of s˜2(ψ/k) on our compact neighbor-
hood, we know s˜2(Y ) has a finite supremum over the com-
pact set B(Y0, δ1), which gives the uniformO(k−1) bound.
Finally, we must consider the third term of (54).
∇ψ[∇ψ(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
] =
∇2(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
− ∇(Z(ψ))(∇(Z(ψ)))
ᵀ
Z(ψ)2
(57)
Recall that Z(ψ) had a local O(k−2) error term as given
by (Kass et al., 1990). We wish to bound the derivatives
of logFk(ψ), but the local bound on this error term given
by Kass does not bound its derivatives. However, a slight
modification of the argument of (Kass et al., 1990) shows
that our added assumptions about the higher order deriva-
tives are sufficient to control the behavior of this error term.
The following expression is their equation (2.2), translated
to our setting:
exp(−ks(φ, Y )) =
exp(−ks(φ∗Y , Y )) exp(
1
2
∇2s(φ∗Y , Y )u2)W (φ, Y ) (58)
W (φ, Y ) = 1− 1
6
k−1/2∇3s(φ∗Y , Y )u3
+
1
72
k−1(∇3s(φ∗Y , Y ))2u6
− 1
24
k−1∇4s(φ∗Y , Y )u4
− 1
120
k−3/2∇5s(φ∗Y , Y )u5
+
1
72
k−3/2∇3A(s(φ∗Y , Y ))∇4s(φ∗Y , Y )u7
+G(φ, φ∗Y , Y ), (59)
whereG(φ, φ∗Y , Y ) is the fifth-order Taylor expansion error
term (i.e. it depends on the sixth-order partial derivatives at
some φ′ between φ and φ∗Y ).
We may continue this Taylor expansion another de-
gree further to bound the variation of G(φ, φ∗Y , Y ) for
φ ∈ B(φ∗Y , δ2). We will consider Z(ψ), ∇ψZ(ψ), and
∇2ψZ(ψ) as three separate functions, each permitting a
higher order Taylor expansion. Each will have their own re-
spective error term depending on the seventh-order partial
derivatives at some φ′, but we note that φ′ is not necessarily
the same for each of them.
The argument of (Kass et al., 1990) already shows how the
terms composing their O(k−2) error term can be bounded
in terms of ∇6φS(φ∗Y , Y ). It is trivial to show an anal-
ogous result for our higher order approximations. This
allows us to extend our approximation of Z(ψ) and its
derivatives uniformly to the neighborhood B(φ∗Y , δ2). The
newly introduced extra approximation terms are O(k−v)
with v ≥ 2, and so our uniform bounds are still simply
O(k−2), though with a larger constant now.
Let k be sufficiently large, and let Q,R, S be positive con-
stants satisfying 0 < Q < ||Z(ψ)||, R > k||∇ψZ(ψ)||,
S > k||∇2ψZ(ψ)|| for all ψ in {ψ|ψ/k ∈ B(Y0, δ). We re-
mark thatQ exists by virtue of Z = 1+O(k−1)+O(k−2).
R and S similarly exist by ||∇ψZ(ψ)|| and ||∇2ψZ(ψ)||
both being O(k−1) with no constant term in front.
∇ψ[∇ψ(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
] ≤ S
kQ
− R
2
k2Q2
for all Y ′ ∈ B(Y0, δ)
This right hand side is clearly O(k−1), and we have uni-
form bounds across our neighborhood.
∇ψ[∇ψ(Z(ψ))
Z(ψ)
] = O(k−1) (60)
Combining the results of (55), (56), (60) with their sum in
(54), we get this result:
||∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k)|| = O(k−1). (61)
This uniform asymptotic bound then ensures we have the
intended result: ∃C,K such that ∀Y ∈ B(Y0, δ1) when
k > K and ψ = kY we have ||∇2ψ logFk(ψ/k)|| ≤ C/k

C PRIVACY PROPERTIES OF OTHER
MCMC ALGORITHMS
In the main manuscript we showed the privacy cost of
Gibbs sampling by interpreting it as an instance of the
exponential mechanism. Here, we show the privacy cost
of two other widely used MCMC algorithms: Metropolis-
Hastings and annealed importance sampling.
C.1 METROPOLIS-HASTINGS UPDATES
Since Gibbs updates are a special case of Metropolis-
Hastings updates, one might conjecture that general
Metropolis-Hastings updates may be differentially private
as well. However, the accept/reject decision contains a sub-
tle non-determinacy which violates pure- differential pri-
vacy. Consider a Metropolis-Hastings update with a sym-
metric proposal θ′ ∼ f(θ, θ′) (a.k.a. a Metropolis update),
Pr(accept;X, θ, θ′, T ) = min
(
1,
(Pr(θ′|X)
Pr(θ|X)
) 1
T
)
(62)
where T is the temperature of the Markov chain. For these
updates, “uphill” moves are never rejected. Since a move
may be uphill in one database and downhill in a neighbor,
we cannot bound the ratio of reject decisions, which vio-
lates differential privacy. It turns out that Metropolis up-
dates do have a weaker privacy guarantee, by resorting to
(, δ)-differential privacy:
Theorem C.1. Let X be private data and θ be a public
current value of the variables we wish to infer. A Metropo-
lis update invariant to the posterior Pr(θ|X) at temper-
ature T = 24 logPr(θ,X) , with symmetric proposal θ
′ ∼
f(θ, θ′) and with Pr(reject;X, θ, T ) =
∫
f(θ, θ′)(1 −
Pr(accept;X, θ, θ′, T ))dθ′ ≤ δ, is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate.
A proof of Theorem C.1 is provided below in Appendix D.
Essentially, we can bound the ratio of probabilities for ac-
cept decisions under neighboring databases, but not for re-
ject decisions. If rejections are rare, these privacy-violating
outcomes are rare, which is sufficient for (, δ)-privacy. On
the other hand, δ must be very small for a meaningful level
of privacy, e.g. less than the inverse of any polyomial in
the number of data points N (Dwork and Roth, 2013), so
this may not typically correspond to a practical privacy-
preserving sampling algorithm.
C.2 ANNEALED IMPORTANCE SAMPLING
The privacy results for Gibbs sampling and Metropolis-
Hastings updates reveal a close connection between privacy
and the temperature of the Markov chain. Low-temperature
chains are high-fidelity but privacy-expensive, while high-
temperature chains are low-fidelity but privacy-cheap, and
also mix more rapidly. This suggests that annealing meth-
ods, such as annealed importance sampling (AIS) (Neal,
2001), may be effective in this context, by allowing savings
in the privacy budget in the early iterations of MCMC while
also traversing the state space more rapidly. AIS is a Monte
Carlo method which anneals from a high-temperature dis-
tribution to the target distribution (in our case the posterior)
via MCMC updates at a sequence of temperatures, produc-
ing importance weights for each sample to correct for the
annealing. AIS takes as input an annealing path, a sequence
of unnormalized distributions fn(θ), . . . , f0(θ) at different
temperatures. We can obtain a privacy-preserving AIS an-
nealing path by varying :
fj(θ) = Pr(θ,X)
βj , βj =
j
24 logPr(θ,X) , (63)
where each intermediate distribution fj is an instance of
Equation 6, and j is the privacy cost for an exact sam-
ple from fj . We can sample at each temperature using the
private Gibbs transition operator from Equation 19. The
privacy cost of an AIS sample is computed via the compo-
sition theorem,
(AIS) =
∑
j
∑
l
j =
∑
j
Dj , (64)
where l ranges over the D variables to be updated. If each
Gibbs update only depends on a single data point xl, we can
improve this via parallel composition (Song et al., 2013) to
(AIS) =
∑
j
j . (65)
On completion of the algorithm we must compute impor-
tance weights ωi for the samples θ(i):
logωi =
n−1∑
j=0
(
log fj(θ
(i,j))− log fj+1(θ(i,j))
)
(66)
=
n−1∑
j=0
(
βj logPr(θ
(i,j),X)− βj+1 logPr(θ(i,j),X)
)
=
1
24 logPr(θ,X)
n−1∑
j=0
(j − j+1) logPr(θ(i,j),X).
We only need to release private copies of the importance
weights at the end of the procedure, as they are not used
during the algorithm. If we are not interested in computing
normalization constants, we can release a normalized ver-
sion of the weights, dividing by
∑
i ωi. This is a discrete
distribution which sums to one, and so it lives on the sim-
plex. This hasL1 sensitivity at most 2, and can be protected
by the Laplace mechanism. Another possible alternative is
to perform resampling of the θ(i)’s according to this dis-
tribution, approximated and protected via the exponential
mechanism.
D PROOF OF THEOREM C.1
Here, we prove the differential privacy result for
Metropolis-Hastings given in Theorem C.1, above.
PROOF: Let X(1), X(2) be neighboring databases.
By the definition of differential privacy, we need to
bound the ratios of the probability of each outcome,
{(accept, reject), θ(new)} for these two databases. We con-
sider accept and reject outcomes separately.
D.1 ACCEPT OUTCOME
The probability of an accepted move to location θ(new) =
z′ is
Pr(accept, θ(new) = θ′;X, θ)
= f(θ, θ′)Pr(accept;X, θ, θ′, T ) .
We must bound the probability ratio of this outcome un-
der the two neighboring datasets. Consider first a slightly
simpler question, the ratio of probabilities for an accept de-
cision, having already selected the proposal θ′,
Pr(accept;X(1), θ, θ′)
Pr(accept;X(2), θ, θ′)
.
We will perform the computation in log space. We have the
log of the acceptance probabilities as
logPr(accept;X, θ, θ′, T ) =
min
(
0,

24 logPr(θ,X)
(
logPr(θ′|X)− logPr(θ|X)))
=

24 logPr(θ,X) min
(
0, logPr(θ′|X)− logPr(θ|X)
)
.
The difference in log probabilities for the accept outcome
is
logPr(accept;X(1), θ, θ′)− logPr(accept;X(2), θ, θ′)
=

24 logPr(θ,X)×(
min
(
0, logPr(θ′|X(1))− logPr(θ|X(1)))
−min (0, logPr(θ′|X(2))− logPr(θ|X(2)))) .
Let
a = logPr(θ′|X(1))− logPr(θ|X(1))
b = logPr(θ′|X(2))− logPr(θ|X(2)) .
There are four cases to consider:
a ≤ 0, b ≤ 0:
min(0, a)−min(0, b) = a− b
a > 0, b ≤ 0:
min(0, a)−min(0, b) = −b ≤ a− b
a ≤ 0, b > 0:
min(0, a)−min(0, b) = a ≤ 0
a > 0, b > 0:
min(0, a)−min(0, b) = 0 .
So either min(0, a) − min(0, b) ≤ 0, in which case the
difference in log probabilities is ≤ 0 ≤ , or min(0, a) −
min(0, b) ≤ a− b. In the former, we are done, so consider
the latter case:
logPr(accept;X(1), θ, θ′)− logPr(accept;X(2), θ, θ′)
≤ 
24 logPr(θ,X)
((
logPr(θ′|X(1))− logPr(θ|X(1)))
−( logPr(θ′|X(2))− logPr(θ|X(2))))
=

24 logPr(θ,X)
(
logPr(θ′|X(1))− logPr(θ′|X(2))
+ logPr(θ|X(2))− logPr(θ|X(1))
)
=

24 logPr(θ,X)
(
logPr(θ′|X(1))− logPr(θ′|X(2))
+ logPr(X(1))− logPr(X(2))
+ logPr(θ|X(2))− logPr(θ|X(1))
+ logPr(X(2))− logPr(X(1))
)
=

24 logPr(θ,X)
(
logPr(θ′,X(1))− logPr(θ′,X(2))
+ logPr(θ,X(2))− logPr(θ,X(1))
)
≤ 
24 logPr(θ,X)
(
4 logPr(θ,X) +4 logPr(θ,X)
)
=  .
The inequality in the last line follows from Equation 7 in
the main paper.
Having bounded the log ratio of probabilities by  for
the simpler case where the proposal θ′ is given, we can
now bound the ratios for the full output, of the form
(accept, θ(new)), as required for -differential privacy, by
simply cancelling the log transition probabilities:
logPr(accept, θ(new) = θ′;X(1), θ)
− logPr(accept, θ(new) = θ′;X(2), θ)
= log f(θ, θ′) + logPr(accept;X(1), θ, θ′)
− (log f(θ, θ′) + logPr(accept;X(2), θ, θ′))
= logPr(accept;X(1), θ, θ′)− logPr(accept;X(2), θ, θ′)
≤  .
This is as desired for pure- privacy, and so the weaker
(, δ)-criterion holds for this outcome as well.
D.2 REJECT OUTCOME
If we could also similarly bound the difference in log prob-
abilities between neighboring databases for the outcome
(reject, θ(new) = θ) by , then the Metropolis update would
be -differentially private. Consider first the reject proba-
bilities after the proposal θ′ is selected:
Pr(reject;X, θ, θ′)
= 1−min
(
1,
(Pr(θ′|X)
Pr(θ|X)
) 
24 logPr(θ,X)
)
= max
(
0, 1− (Pr(θ′|X)
Pr(θ|X)
) 
24 logPr(θ,X)
)
.
When Pr(θ′|X) > Pr(θ|X), the probability of a reject
decision is 0. It is possible to construct scenarios where the
probability of a reject decision is 0 for all proposals θ′, e.g.
when θ is at a global minimum, so we cannot in general
lower bound the overall probability of a reject,
Pr(reject, θ(new) = θ;X, θ)
=
∫
f(θ, θ′)(1− Pr(accept;X, θ, θ′, T ))dθ′ .
If Pr(reject, θ(new) = θ;X, θ) = 0 occurs in database
X(1) and not in X(2), the ratio of probabilities for this
outcome will be infinite due to a division by 0, violating
-differential privacy. Under our assumptions, we have an
additional guarantee that Pr(reject, θ(new) = θ;X, θ) ≤ δ,
i.e. the probability of a rejection outcome, and therefore
the probability of an outcome that violates -differential
privacy, is less than δ. To demonstrate (, δ) privacy and
complete the proof, we observe that this condition implies
that the (, δ)-criterion holds for the reject outcome:
Pr(reject, θ(new) = θ;X(1), θ)
≤ δ ≤ exp()Pr(reject, θ(new) = θ;X(2), θ) + δ .

x
(r,t)
i,d Discrete-valued feature d of log entry i, from region r, timestep t.
zr,t Latent state at region r, timestep t.
Ak,k Transition probability from state k to k′.
θ
(k,d)
j Discrete emission probability for cluster k’s d’th feature being outcome j.
α, β Dirichlet concentration parameters.
Nr,t Number of log entries (observations) in region r at timestep t.
D Number of features in the observations.
K Number of latent clusters.
Table 2: Notation for the Wikileaks naive Bayes HMM model.
E DETAILS OF WIKILEAKS WAR LOGS
HMM
In this appendix we describe the technical details of the
HMM model with naive Bayes observations, which we ap-
ply to the Wikileaks War Logs data. The assumed genera-
tive process of the model is:
For k = 1, . . . ,K //For each latent cluster
Ak,: ∼ Dirichlet(α) //K-dimensional
For d = 1, . . . , D //For each feature
θ(k,d) ∼ Dirichlet(β) //Kd-dimensional
A0,: ∼ Dirichlet(α) //Dummy state
For r = 1, . . . , R //For each region
zr,0 = 0 //Dummy initial state
For t = 1, . . . , T //For each timestep
zr,t ∼ Discrete(Azr,t−1,:)
For i = 1, . . . , Nr,t //For each log entry
For d = 1, . . . , D //For each feature
x
(r,t)
i,d ∼ Discrete(θ(zr,t,d)).
Here, α and β correspond to the concentration parame-
ters for appropriately dimensioned Dirichlet distributions.
See Table 2 for a summary of the notation. The generative
model corresponds to the joint probability
Pr(A, θ,Z,X|α, β) = (67)
K∏
k=0
Pr(Ak,:|α)
K∏
k=1
D∏
d=1
Pr(θ(k,d)|β)
×
R∏
r=1
T∏
t=1
Pr(zr,t|zr,t−1,A)
×
R∏
r=1
T∏
t=1
Nr,t∏
i=1
Pr(x
(r,t)
i,d |zr,t, θ) .
Inspired by Goldwater and Griffiths (2007), we marginal-
ize out the transition matrix A. Let X(r,t) be an Nr,t ×D
matrix containing the log entry observations at region r,
timestep t. We obtain the following partially collapsed
Gibbs update for zr,t:
Pr(zr,t|zr,t−1, zr,t+1,X(r,t), θ, α) (68)
∝Pr(zr,t|zr,t−1)Pr(zr,t+1|zr,t)Pr(X(r,t)|zr,t, θ)
=
nzr,t,zr,t−1 + α
nzr,t−1 +Kα
nzr,t+1,zr,t + I[zr,t−1 = zr,t = zr,t+1] + α
nzr,t + I[zr,t−1 = zr,t] +Kα
× Pr(X(r,t)|zr,t, θ) ,
where nz,z′ are transition counts, excluding the current z
to be updated, and the transition probabilities are implicitly
conditioned on all other z’s, which they depend on via the
transition counts. The indicator functions arise from book-
keeping as the counts are modified by changing the current
state. Due to conjugacy we have a simple update for θ(k,d),
Pr(θ(k,d)|X,Z, β) ∼ Dirichlet(nd,k,: + β) , (69)
where nd,k,: =
∑
r,t nr,t,d,: is a Kd-dimensional count
vector of counts for feature d in cluster k.
E.1 PRESERVING PRIVACY
To privatize the likelihood via the Laplace mechanism, we
first write Equation 70 in exponential family form. The
conditional likelihood for X(r,t) given zr,t can be written
as
Pr(X(r,t)|zr,t, θ) =
Nr,t∏
i=1
Pr(x
(r,t)
i,d |zr,t, θ) (70)
=
Nr,t∏
i=1
D∏
d=1
θ
(zr,t,d)
x
(r,t)
i,d
=
D∏
d=1
Kd∏
j=1
θ
(zr,t,d)
nr,t,d,j
j ,
where nr,t,d,j =
∑Nr,t
i=1 I[x
(r,t)
i,d = j], and I[·] is the indica-
tor function. From here we obtain the exponential family
form
Pr(X(r,t)|zr,t, θ) = exp
( D∑
d=1
Kd∑
j=1
nr,t,d,j log θ
(zr,t,d)
j
)
.
(71)
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Figure 9: Log-likelihood of held-out data for a naive Bayes model, equivalent to the HMM with one timestep (Top) and
the full HMM (Bottom). Left: Afghanistan. Right: Iraq. Truncation point for the truncated Dirichlet distributions for
OPS was set to a0 = 1MKd , with truncation multiplier M = 10 and M = 100.
The sufficient statistics are the counts nr,t,d,j , which we
can privatize via the Laplace mechanism, resulting in pri-
vate counts nˆr,t,d,j . As a sum of indicator vectors, each
count vector nr,t,d,: has L1 sensitivity = 2. We can perform
the Gibbs updates for Z in a privacy-preserving manner
by substituting the private counts for the counts in Equa-
tion 68. To preserve privacy when updating θ, Equation 69
can be estimated based on the privacy-preserving counts
nˆr,t,d,:. Importantly, we only need to compute private
counts nˆr,t,d,j once, at the beginning of the algorithm, and
these privatized counts can be reused for all of the Gibbs
updates.
E.2 EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
We performed some simple preprocessing steps before
the experiment. Casualty count fields for each log en-
try were binarized (0 versus > 0). The wounded
wounded/killed/detained fields were merged disjunctively
into one casualty indicator field. The Friendly (i.e. U.S.
military) and HostNation (Iraq or Afghanistan) casualty in-
dicators were combined into one field via disjunction. For
the Iraq dataset, there were some missing data issues that
had to be addressed. No data was available for the 5th
month, which was removed. Most regions had no data for
the final year of the Iraq data, so this was also removed. Fi-
nally, we removed the MND-S and MND-NE region codes
from our analysis, as these regions had very little data.
To simulate from truncated Dirichlet distributions for the
Gibbs updates of the OPS method, we used the approach
of Fang et al. (2000), which involves sequentially draw-
ing each component based on a truncated Beta distribution.
Full visualization results are shown in Figures 10 to 13.
Log-likelihood results on held-out data are given in Figure
9. In this experiment, we randomly held-out 10% of the re-
gion/timestep pairs for testing for each of 5 train/test splits,
and reported the average log-likelihood over the repeats.
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Figure 10: State assignments of privacy-preserving HMM on Iraq (Laplace mechanism,  = 5) (Top).
Middle: State 1. Bottom: State 2.
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Figure 11: State assignments and parameters for OPS privacy-preserving HMM on Iraq. (OPS,  = 5, truncation point
a0 =
1
100Kd
). Top Left: Estimate from last 100 samples. Top Right: Estimate from last one sample. Middle: State 1.
Bottom: State 2.
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Figure 12: State assignments of privacy-preserving HMM on Afghanistan (Laplace mechanism,  = 5) (Top). Parameters
for States 1, 2, and 3, ordered from top to bottom.
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Figure 13: State assignments and parameters for OPS privacy-preserving HMM on Afghanistan. (OPS,  = 5, truncation
point a0 = 1100Kd ). Top Left: Estimate from last 100 samples. Top Right: Estimate from last one sample. Parameters for
States 1, 2, and 3, ordered from top to bottom.
